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Abstract
Asymmetric cost behavior has attracted the interest of many (empirical) researchers 
in the last years. Prior research determines several sources of this behavior such as 
resource adjustment costs, uncertainties and related beliefs, agency problems, and 
fixed costs. Empirical studies measure firms’ cost behavior using total firm costs 
and sales. In imperfect markets, firms react to changing market conditions by adapt‑
ing output prices and quantities so that both total firm costs and sales are affected. 
However, changing output prices only directly affects sales and not costs. Based on 
an economic model, we identify market decisions (output quantity and pricing deci‑
sions) as an additional source of measured asymmetric cost behavior.
Keywords Asymmetric cost behavior · Market decisions · Pricing · Imperfect 
markets
Mathematics Subject Classification 91B99
1 Introduction
The empirical study by Anderson et al. (2003, in the following ABJ) documents that 
the cost response following a decline of the firm’s activity level is smaller than the cost 
response to an increasing activity level (i.e., costs are sticky). The study by ABJ stimu‑
lated a large number of follow up research analyzing several cost categories (e.g. COGS 
or R&D costs), several countries, or sources of cost stickiness.1 The asymmetric costs 
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1 See Anderson et al. (2007), Balakrishnan and Gruca (2008), Chen et al. (2012), Banker et al. (2013a), 
Kama and Weiss (2013), Cannon (2014), Banker and Byzalov (2014), Banker et al. (2014), Holzhacker 
et al. (2015), Kitching et al. (2016), Li and Zheng (2017), and Prabowo et al. (2018).
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literature provides empirical evidence for the existence of asymmetric cost behavior 
around the world and identifies several determinants explaining this observation. First, 
firms face resource adjustment costs (Anderson et al. 2003; Banker and Byzalov 2014). 
In addition, prior literature determines uncertainties and related beliefs (Banker et al. 
2014), agency problems related to empire building (Chen et al. 2012), and fixed costs as 
sources of asymmetric cost behavior (Anderson et al. 2007; Balakrishnan et al. 2014).2
It is widely accepted in the empirical literature to analyze asymmetric cost behav‑
ior using the ABJ econometric model, which uses total firm sales as output meas‑
ure to examine the firms’ cost behavior.3 In addition, Balakrishnan et al. (2014, in 
the following BLS) introduce two adaptions of the ABJ specification: a percent‑
age specification and a scaled percentage specification. Arguments supporting the 
choice of total firm sales as output measure are that sales are available in standard 
large‑scale datasets like Compustat and that it is not possible in multi‑product firms 
using several input resources to aggregate differing physical measures of resource 
consumption to one single measure (Banker and Byzalov 2014, footnote 24). How‑
ever, Banker and Byzalov (2014, footnote 30) point also out that changes in input 
prices may affect the measured asymmetric cost behavior. Relatedly, by choosing 
sales as output measure, output prices may also affect the measured asymmetric cost 
behavior. The majority of the examined firms operates on markets with imperfect 
competition. This provides some leeway in setting output prices. However, pricing 
decisions influence sales, but do not necessarily result in corresponding changes of 
resource consumption and costs. Thus, following the suggestion of Anderson and 
Lanen (2007), we study how changes on the demand side of the firm affect the cost 
behavior. We examine the following question: Do market decisions result in asym‑
metric cost behavior as measured by the (adaptions of the) ABJ specification when 
the firm faces imperfect competition on the final output market?
We develop a parsimonious economic model of a firm operating in differing 
imperfect markets (like monopoly, duopoly, and oligopoly markets).4 To single out 
the impact of market decisions on the measured asymmetric cost behavior, we study 
a setting in which none of the known sources of asymmetric cost behavior occur. 
Our findings show that market decisions, i.e., output quantity and pricing decisions, 
in imperfect markets affect the measured asymmetric cost behavior. The intuition is 
as follows. When the market conditions change, the firm adapts both the price and 
the optimal quantity under Cournot‑quantity competition (and in a monopoly set‑
ting). While the price only affects sales, the quantity influences both sales and costs. 
Consequently, sales and costs do not change proportionally and thus, create asym‑
metric cost behavior. Under Bertrand‑price competition with homogeneous prod‑
ucts and costs, the firm reacts to changing market conditions by solely adapting the 
quantity. The price is unaffected so that sales and costs change proportionally and 
2 An extensive literature review is provided by Banker and Byzalov (2014) and Banker et al. (2018).
3 The ABJ specification is for example used by Calleja et  al. (2006), Balakrishnan and Gruca (2008), 
Chen et al. (2012), Banker et al. (2013a), Banker et al. (2013b), Cannon (2014), Holzhacker et al. (2015), 
Kitching et al. (2016), Subramaniam and Watson (2016), and Li and Zheng (2017).
4 The analytical model allows us to non‑ambiguously identify the effect market conditions have on a 
firm’s cost behavior. This is an advantage over simulations and empirical analyses, where the findings are 
not valid in general.
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the firm exhibits symmetric cost behavior. In sum, the firm displays measured asym‑
metric cost behavior when the firm adapts both the output quantity and the price in 
imperfect markets.
We contribute to the existing asymmetric costs literature by analytically identify‑
ing market decisions as an additional source of measured asymmetric cost behav‑
ior. Prior literature determines resource adjustment costs, uncertainties and related 
beliefs, agency problems, and fixed costs as sources of the asymmetric cost behavior. 
When the firm’s activity level changes, managers have to adjust the resources to the 
firm’s needs. The adjustment may be costly depending on the resource’s characteris‑
tics. Adjustment costs may range from almost zero (e.g. direct material for produc‑
tion) over an intermediate level (e.g. employee costs) to almost prohibitively costly 
(e.g. plant and equipment). For the adjustment decision, managers trade off adjust‑
ment costs and (future) benefits of the adjustment (Anderson et al. 2003; Banker and 
Byzalov 2014). Specifically, if a manager expects only a short‑run decrease of the 
firm’s activity level, the decision to keep slack resources may save on future costs 
of reinstalling the same resource again, offering in total a higher profit to the firm 
(Banker et al. 2014). Agency problems may cause asymmetric cost behavior when a 
self‑interested manager maximizes personal utility at the cost of shareholder value. 
For example, a manager may refrain from downsizing a division because of loss of 
status or dismissing familiar employees (Anderson et  al. 2003; Chen et  al. 2012). 
Past managerial decisions determine a firm’s fixed costs that cannot be controlled. 
Therefore, the existence of fixed costs leads to a non‑proportional change of costs 
when sales change, thus causing asymmetric cost behavior (Anderson et al. 2007; 
Balakrishnan et al. 2014).
How much of the empirically documented asymmetric cost behavior is due to 
market decisions and how much is attributable to the established sources is an open 
issue. Our theoretical analysis suggests that market decisions affect the measured 
asymmetric cost behavior. Nevertheless, further empirical research is needed to esti‑
mate the size of the market decision effect. To do this, using output instead of sales 
for measuring the asymmetric cost behavior is helpful because our results depict 
that using output circumvents the market decision effect. Output quantities are rarely 
disclosed in annual reports or other public information sources. Therefore, the use of 
case studies or surveys seems appropriate for studying the size of the market deci‑
sion effect and gaining deeper insight into the sources of the measured asymmet‑
ric cost behavior. When archival data is used for studying cost behavior, the market 
decisions need to be disentangled from the established sources of asymmetric cost 
behavior. Considering more market aspects (like development of output prices over 
time, changes in the product mix, or acknowledging the firm’s presence in several 
markets) are helpful in achieving this aim. Segment reports or the MD&A section 
of annual reports may provide helpful information on these aspects. Examining in 
empirical studies the market decision effect on the measured asymmetric cost behav‑
ior will foster our understanding of the magnitude and sources of the asymmetric 
cost behavior.
The paper proceeds as follows: Sect.  2 presents the ABJ econometric model 
specification and its adaptions used for measuring asymmetric cost behavior in 
empirical studies. Section 3 presents the economic model. Then, Sect. 4 illustrates a 
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benchmark for measuring asymmetric cost behavior using quantity as output meas‑
ure. The impact of market decisions on the measured asymmetric cost behavior 
using the ABJ and BLS (scaled) percentage specification in a monopolistic market 
or a market with Cournot‑quantity competition is studied in Sect. 5. The effect of 
Bertrand‑price competition is depicted in Sect. 6. Section 7 discusses the relevance 
of the findings and implications for empirical research.
2  Measuring asymmetric cost behavior
Most of the empirical research analyzing asymmetric cost behavior builds on the 
log–log‑econometric model suggested by ABJ, which regresses changes in costs C 
on changes in sales S from period t − 1 to period t:5
where dec is an indicator of value 1 if sales decline (and 0 otherwise). β1,ABJ is the 
percentage change in costs when sales increase by 1%. β1,ABJ + β2,ABJ is the percent‑
age change in costs when sales decrease by 1%. Costs are sticky if the increase in 
costs following an increase in sales is higher than a corresponding decrease if sales 
decrease, i.e., β2,ABJ < 0. For β2,ABJ > 0, the effect is called anti‑stickiness (Weiss 
2010). Thus, β2,ABJ measures asymmetric cost behavior.
The ABJ specification is adapted by BLS as percentage specification:
and as scaled percentage specification:6
The interpretation of β2,j with j ∈ {BLS, sBLS} as measured asymmetric cost 
behavior also applies to the BLS specifications.
In an analytical model, we study the impact of market decisions on the meas‑
ured asymmetric cost behavior while concentrating on the cost behavior of a single 
firm. For identifying the firm’s cost behavior, we use the three measurement speci‑
fications previously described. Determining the firm’s cost behavior requires the 
consideration of at least one sales increase and one sales decrease. We examine a 
sales increase and decrease using two approaches. First, we consider a single mar‑
ket change that either results in increasing or decreasing sales to calculate the cost 
behavior measures (the single‑market‑change approach). Specifically, we introduce 
(1)ln
(
Ct,i
Ct−1,i
)
= 훼 + 훽1,ABJ ⋅ ln
(
St,i
St−1,i
)
+ 훽2,ABJ ⋅ dec ⋅ ln
(
St,i
St−1,i
)
+ 휀,
(2)
Ct,i − Ct−1,i
Ct−1,i
= 훼 + 훽1,BLS ⋅
St,i − St−1,i
St−1,i
+ 훽2,BLS ⋅ dec ⋅
St,i − St−1,i
St−1,i
+ 휀,
(3)
Ct,i − Ct−1,i
St−1,i
= 훼 + 훽1,sBLS ⋅
St,i − St−1,i
St−1,i
+ 훽2,sBLS ⋅ dec ⋅
St,i − St−1,i
St−1,i
+ 휀.
5 The subscript ABJ denotes the ABJ specification of the econometric model.
6 The subscript BLS (sBLS) denotes the (scaled) percentage specification introduced by BLS.
1 3
Research note: an analytical perspective on market decisions…
a baseline sales level followed by an increasing or decreasing sales level. Second, 
we consider the firm’s market decisions for a sequence of two market changes (the 
sequence‑of‑two‑market‑changes approach). The sequence‑of‑two‑market‑changes 
approach uses the firm itself as a benchmark to determine the firm’s cost behavior. 
In most empirical studies, the dataset comprises several years of the same firms so 
that the sequence‑of‑two‑market‑changes approach better fits previous research.
The analytical model allows us to calculate the firm’s sales and cost increases 
(decreases) in a setting without errors and uncertainties. Then, focusing on a single 
firm and on one sales increase and one sales decrease implies that we can directly 
calculate the firm’s cost response following an increasing (decreasing) activity level. 
That is, no regression is needed to determine the firm’s cost behavior so that the 
error term 휀 and the intercept 훼 are 0 in either of the three measurement specifi‑
cations. We use this and either the single‑market‑change or the sequence‑of‑two‑
market‑changes approach to determine the firm’s cost behavior by calculating the 
measures β1,k and β2,k with k ∈ {ABJ,BLS, sBLS} . Next, we introduce the economic 
model in detail.
3  The model
To analyze the impact of market decisions in imperfect markets on the measured 
asymmetric cost behavior, we develop a parsimonious economic model focus‑
ing solely on output and pricing decisions to avoid any overlapping effects with 
established sources of asymmetric cost behavior. Specifically, we consider a sin‑
gle product firm operating in a monopoly or Cournot‑quantity competition. For a 
monopolistic firm, choosing price or output as decision variable yields the same 
result. Therefore, we present the monopoly case together with Cournot‑quantity 
competition. For its product, the firm faces the linear inverse demand function 
pt(xt) = at − b ⋅ xt , where pt and xt denote the market price and the (total) mar‑
ket quantity of the final product in period t. Total market quantity is defined as 
xt =
∑n
i=1
xt,i , where n indicates the number of competitors operating on the market. 
If n = 1, the firm serves a monopoly market without any competition. For n = 2, we 
observe a duopoly and with increasing n an oligopoly market.
The inverse demand function’s intercept at measures the gross size of the mar‑
ket, b the elasticity of demand. The market size may vary over time because of, 
for example, changing customer preferences and their willingness to pay. In each 
period, the firm chooses the output quantity. The costs of producing one unit of out‑
put is c > 0 and neither resource adjustment nor fixed costs exist. To focus on the 
pure impact of the market decision, we assume that costs c do not vary over time, all 
firms on the market face the same costs,7 the firm knows all subsequent market sizes 
before making the first market decision (no uncertainties and related beliefs), and no 
agency problem exists.
7 Given this assumption, all firms have the same market share. The results of the analysis do not qualita‑
tively change if considering differing costs c and consequently differing market shares.
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According to economic theory, firm i maximizes its profit by choosing the opti‑
mal output quantity of the final product x∗
t,i
 . This results in the following decisions:
For the following analysis, we use two approaches to study changing activity 
levels:
 (i) The single‑market‑change approach: in period t = 0 , the firm faces a baseline 
sales level stemming from a gross market size of a0 . In period t = 1 , the firm 
either faces an increase or decrease of sales because of a gross market size a1 
of a1 > a0 or a1 < a0 , respectively.8
 (ii) The sequence‑of‑two‑market‑changes approach: an increase of sales (compar‑
ing t = 0 and t = 1 ) is followed by a decrease of sales (comparing sales of t = 1 
and t = 2 ). This corresponds with the following ranking of the gross market 
sizes: a0 < a1 and a2 < a1 . We compare the size of the two changes. If the 
second sales change is larger (smaller) than the first change, we label this as 
large (small) market change. A large (small) market change occurs for a0 > a2 
( a0 < a2).9
The parsimonious economic model does not comprise intertemporal interdepend‑
encies so that multi‑period considerations are superfluous.10
4  Benchmark with quantities as output measure
Most empirical studies use sales as output measure for studying the asymmetric cost 
behavior. That is, sales is the measure for the firm’s activity level. Another poten‑
tial measure is the production quantity. To illustrate the impact of market decisions 
(4)x∗t,i =
at − c
b ⋅ (n + 1)
,
(5)p∗t =
at + n ⋅ c
n + 1
,
(6)C∗t,i = x∗t,i ⋅ c =
c
b ⋅ (n + 1)
⋅ (at − c),
(7)S∗t,i = x∗t,i ⋅ p∗t =
1
b ⋅ (n + 1)2
⋅ (at + n ⋅ c) ⋅ (at − c).
8 To simplify the analysis, we assume throughout the paper c < a
t
 and a
t
− c ≥ 1 . c < a
t
 is to ensure pro‑
duction in each period to avoid unnecessary case distinctions for making the point. a
t
− c ≥ 1 is chosen, 
because we need to consider the natural logarithm of the difference a
t
− c , which is always positive given 
to this assumption.
9 The results of the analysis persist if we consider the opposite sequence of gross market size changes.
10 We do not consider the time value of money. This simplification does not affect our qualitative results.
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on measuring asymmetric cost behavior, we consider a benchmark with production 
quantity as output measure in the ABJ specification of the asymmetric cost measure. 
Therefore, we replace sales S
t,i
 by the production quantity x
t,i
 in (1). In the next step, 
we insert the optimal output quantities and the corresponding costs according to (4) 
and (6) in (1) to analytically calculate 훽1,ABJ and 훽2,ABJ . As argued before, 휀 = 0 and 
훼 = 0 . We do this for both the single‑market‑change and the sequence‑of‑two‑mar‑
ket‑changes approach to derive the results.
Proposition 1 With the production quantity as output measure in the ABJ specifi-
cation of measuring the asymmetric cost behavior, the asymmetric cost measure 훽C
X
 
has the following properties:11 
• 훽C
1,X
= 1 and
• 훽C
2,X
= 0.12
Choosing either the single-market-change or the sequence-of-two-market-
changes approach to study changing activity levels does not affect the properties of 
the asymmetric cost measure.
The proof is in the “Appendix”.
Costs arise because production of the firm’s output requires the consumption of 
resources. In the setting analyzed, there is no change in the production technology. 
Therefore, resource consumption for producing one unit of output does not change 
when market conditions change. The firm faces constant costs c per unit. If market 
conditions change, the firm adapts the production quantity to maximize profit given 
the new market situation. The output quantity reflects that neither the production 
technology nor the resource consumption per unit change. The ratio of the change 
in costs always equals the ratio of the change in quantity. This results in 훽C
1,X
= 1 and 
훽C
1,X
+ 훽C
2,X
= 1 , i.e., 훽C
2,X
= 0. Asymmetric cost behavior is absent. That is, with out‑
put quantity as output measure, the market decision effect is not a source of meas‑
ured asymmetric cost behavior.
5  Asymmetric cost behavior with sales as output measure
In this section, we return to the sales‑based measurement specifications of the asym‑
metric cost behavior presented in Sect. 2. Inserting costs (6) and sales (7) in (1) and 
(3) to analytically calculate the ABJ and the BLS scaled percentage measures for 
both the single‑market‑change and the sequence‑of‑two‑market‑changes approach 
yields the findings of Proposition 2.
11 The superscript C denotes Cournot‑quantity competition for n > 2 and the monopoly setting for n = 1. 
The subscript X indicates that the production quantity is used as output measure in the ABJ specification.
12 The same findings are obtained when the BLS (scaled) percentage specification with production quan‑
tity as output measure is used to measure the asymmetric cost behavior.
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Proposition 2 With the ABJ or the BLS scaled percentage specification, the 
asymmetric cost measures 훽C
ABJ
 and 훽C
sBLS
 have the following properties for 
k ∈ {ABJ, sBLS} and
 (i) the single-market-change approach:
• 0 < 𝛽C
1,k
< 1 and
• 𝛽C
2,k
> 0 and 0 < 𝛽C
1,k
+ 𝛽C
2,k
< 1,
 (ii) the sequence-of-two-market-changes approach:
• 0 < 𝛽C
1,k
< 1 and
• 𝛽C
2,k
< 0 and 0 < 𝛽C
1,k
+ 𝛽C
2,k
< 1 if the relative size of the market changes is 
small,
• 𝛽C
2,k
> 0 and 0 < 𝛽C
1,k
+ 𝛽C
2,k
< 1 if the relative size of the market changes is 
large.
The proof is in the “Appendix”.
Proposition 2 illustrates that measured asymmetric cost behavior appears in a set‑
ting where all established sources are absent. Hence, market decisions are a source 
of measured asymmetric cost behavior. The intuition for this finding is as follows: 
The change of the gross market size captured by the demand parameter at induces a 
change of the optimal price and the optimal output quantity to be produced. Inspec‑
tion of (6) and (7) shows that sales is a quadratic function in at . However, costs are a 
linear function in at . Therefore, the effect of a change of at is different for costs and 
sales. Sales and costs do not change proportionally if the firm decides to optimally 
adjust the output quantity according to the changes of the market size. The ratio of 
the change in costs is not equal to the ratio of the change in sales. This results in 
0 < 𝛽C
1,k
< 1 for k ∈ {ABJ, sBLS}.
The effect on 훽C
2,k
 depends on the approach to study changing activity levels and 
for the sequence‑of‑two‑market‑changes approach, additionally, on the relative 
size of the market changes. With the single‑market‑change approach, the measured 
asymmetric cost behavior always indicates anti‑stickiness.
For the sequence‑of‑two‑market‑changes approach, a small market change occurs 
if a2 is larger than the initial level a0 , and 훽C2,k is negative, indicating cost stickiness. 
If a2 is even smaller than the initial level a0 (large market change), then 훽C2,k becomes 
positive, indicating anti‑stickiness.
With a large market change, the sales level in t = 2 is below the initial sales level 
in t = 0 . This corresponds to the single‑market‑change approach, where the sales 
level following a decrease is smaller than the baseline sales level. Therefore, the 
anti‑stickiness result for a large market change is consistent with finding anti‑sticki‑
ness with the single‑market‑change approach.
We repeat the analysis conducted before for the BLS percentage specification.
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Proposition 3 With the BLS percentage specification, the asymmetric cost measure 
훽C
BLS
 has the following properties:
• 0 < 𝛽C
1,BLS
< 1 and
• 𝛽C
2,BLS
> 0 and 0 < 𝛽C
1,BLS
+ 𝛽C
2,BLS
< 1.
Choosing either the single-market-change or the sequence-of-two-market-
changes approach to study changing activity levels does not affect the properties of 
the asymmetric cost measure.
The proof is in the “Appendix”.
Proposition 3 depicts that with the BLS percentage specification the asymmet‑
ric cost behavior in the form of anti‑stickiness always occurs. This is true for both 
the single‑market‑change and the sequence‑of‑two‑market‑changes approach as 
well as for small and large market changes for the sequence‑of‑two‑market‑changes 
approach. Again, the form of costs and sales creates this result. While costs are lin‑
ear in the gross market size, sales are quadratic. For any change in the gross mar‑
ket size, the cost relation is always larger than the sales relation. Consequently, the 
asymmetric cost measure 훽C
2,BLS
 exhibits anti‑stickiness.
Propositions 2 and 3 illustrate that for any econometric measurement specifica‑
tion described in Sect. 2, market decisions are a source of measured asymmetric cost 
behavior.
6  Bertrand‑price competition
Next, we consider Bertrand‑price competition instead of Cournot‑quantity competi‑
tion for the same setting as described in Sect. 3. Each firm (n ≥ 2) sets the respective 
firm price for the firm’s output simultaneously and non‑cooperatively. According to 
the Bertrand paradox, this results in the equilibrium price equaling marginal costs 
(see, for example, Tirole 2001). This implies the following profit maximizing deci‑
sions of firm i:13 
(8)pB
∗
t
= c,
(9)xB
∗
t,i
=
at − c
n ⋅ b
,
(10)CB
∗
t,i
= xB
∗
t,i
⋅ c =
c
n ⋅ b
⋅ (at − c),
(11)SB
∗
t,i
= xB
∗
t,i
⋅ pB
∗
t
=
c
n ⋅ b
⋅ (at − c).
13 The superscript B indicates Bertrand‑price competition.
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Under Bertrand‑price competition with homogeneous products and identical unit 
costs c, each firm sets the price equal to unit production costs c. Because all firms 
have the same unit costs c, we observe a uniform market price pB∗
t
 . Market demand 
given this price is split uniformly among all competing firms. No firm earns a profit, 
because total firm costs correspond to sales. Consequently, total costs and sales 
behave perfect congruently if the firms make price decisions due to a change of the 
gross market size at . Proposition 4 states this finding.14
Proposition 4 If firms compete in prices on an imperfect market according to the 
model setup (Bertrand-price competition with homogeneous products and identical 
unit costs), no asymmetric cost behavior occurs. This is true for both the single-
market-change and the sequence-of-two-market-changes approach as well as any 
measurement specification presented in Sect. 2.
Proof The proof follows straightforwardly from inspection of (10) and (11). □
7  Discussion
An increasing number of empirical research analyses the asymmetric cost behavior 
in firms using sales as output measure. Most of the literature finds evidence of asym‑
metric cost behavior and determines several sources such as resource adjustment 
costs, uncertainties and related beliefs, agency problems, and fixed costs. However, 
firms also react to changing market conditions by adapting output prices and quan‑
tities. We show in an economic model that these market decisions also affect the 
measured asymmetric cost behavior.
We focus on firms operating in imperfect markets with some freedom in setting 
output prices. This setting seems more representative than a perfect market with 
pure price taking firms. We develop a parsimonious model where only conditions of 
the final product market of a firm change and no established source of asymmetric 
cost behavior is present. The firm adapts prices and quantities rationally to maxi‑
mize firm profit. The analysis shows the following results: Market decisions are a 
source of measured asymmetric cost behavior. The effect of market decisions results 
from the different impact of the gross market size on costs and sales. Whereas costs 
are linear in the gross market size, sales are quadratic.
14 However, results change if we relax the assumption of Bertrand‑price competition with homogene‑
ous products. Considering Bertrand‑price competition with differentiated products, firms set their prices 
higher than the marginal costs c. Then, the total firm costs are linear in the gross market size a
t
 , whereas 
total sales are quadratic. This corresponds to the functional forms of total firm costs and total sales with 
Cournot‑quantity competition. As discussed before, the functional forms of total costs and sales are caus‑
ing the findings in the Propositions 2 and 3. Hence, the findings obtained in the Cournot setting also 
occur with Bertrand‑price competition with differentiated products and the market decision effect may 
be a source of measured asymmetric cost behavior for both quantity and price competition. Note that 
allowing for differentiated products in the Cournot setting yields the same qualitative results as obtained 
in Propositions 2 and 3.
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Customer preferences or their willingness to pay may change. Resulting changes 
of the demand function causes firms to adapt prices or output quantity. The newly 
set prices affect measuring the asymmetric cost behavior. This effect occurs in a 
single‑product‑firm as well as for each of the products of a multi‑product firm. How‑
ever, changing market conditions may additionally induce a change in the product 
mix of a multi‑product firm. Firm level sales (costs) is the aggregate of the sales 
(costs) of each single product offered by a firm. Whenever a firm sets new prices 
for some of the products, the weight of a product within this aggregated information 
changes too. This might also affect the measured asymmetric cost behavior for firms 
operating in imperfect markets.
Today, we do not yet know how much of the measured asymmetric cost behav‑
ior stems from market decisions. To measure the size of the market decision effect, 
the output quantities of single products can be used. Then, as our benchmark in 
Sect. 4 depicts, the market decisions have no impact on the measured asymmetric 
cost behavior. That is, using output quantities to measure asymmetric cost behav‑
ior might be helpful to separate the impact of market decisions from the impact 
of the established sources. However, firms rarely disclose the output quantities of 
single products in annual reports, homepages, interviews, or other public informa‑
tion sources. Thus, our results indicate that we need case studies and surveys to 
learn about the size of the market decision effect and to gain more insights into the 
sources of the asymmetric cost behavior. Case studies might also assess whether 
publicly available information is helpful to study the impact of market decisions on 
the asymmetric cost behavior in archival studies. For example, segment reports in 
annual reports of firms might be helpful to gather the relevant information to group 
similar products, whenever product level information is not available. Giving more 
attention to finer information than firm level sales or costs could improve our under‑
standing of the link between market decisions and the established sources of asym‑
metric cost behavior like resource adjustment costs, uncertainties and related beliefs, 
agency problems, and fixed costs.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
For the sequence‑of‑two‑market‑changes approach, 휀 = 0 , 훼 = 0 , Eqs.  (4) and (6), 
dec = 0 , and x∗
t,i
 instead of S∗
t,i
 , Eq. (1) yields:
Then, 훽C
1,X
 and dec = 1 is used to calculate 훽C
2,X
:
Analogously, 훽C
1,X
= 1 and 훽C
2,X
= 0 for the single‑market‑change approach are 
obtained. □
Proof of Proposition 2
For the sequence‑of‑two‑market‑changes approach, 휀 = 0 , 훼 = 0 , Eqs. (6) and (7), and 
dec = 0 , the ABJ specification of Eq. (1) yields:
Then, 훽C
1,ABJ
 and dec = 1 is used to calculate 훽C
2,ABJ
:
𝛽C
1,X
=
ln
(
C
∗
1,i
C
∗
0,i
)
ln
(
x
∗
1,i
x
∗
0,i
) =
ln
(
a1 − c
a0 − c
)
ln
(
a1 − c
a0 − c
)
������ �����
>0
= 1.
훽C
2,X
=
ln
(
C
∗
2,i
C
∗
1,i
)
− 훽C
1,X
ln
(
x
∗
2,i
x
∗
1,i
)
ln
(
x
∗
2,i
x
∗
1,i
) =
ln
(
a2 − c
a1 − c
)
ln
(
a2 − c
a1 − c
) − 훽C
1,x
= 0.
𝛽C
1,ABJ
=
ln
(
C
∗
1,i
C
∗
0,i
)
ln
(
S
∗
1,i
S
∗
0,i
) =
ln
(
a1 − c
a0 − c
)
ln
(
a1 + nc
a0 + nc
)
������� ������
>0
+ ln
(
a1 − c
a0 − c
)
������ �����
>0
∈ (0, 1).
𝛽C
2,ABJ
=
ln
(
C
∗
2,i
C
∗
1,i
)
− 𝛽C
1,ABJ
ln
(
S
∗
2,i
S
∗
1,i
)
ln
(
S
∗
2,i
S
∗
1,i
) =
ln
(
a1 − c
a2 − c
)
ln
(
a1 + nc
a2 + nc
)
������� ������
>0
+ ln
(
a1 − c
a2 − c
)
������ �����
>0
− 𝛽C
1,ABJ
,
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훽C
2,ABJ
 is continuous for a2 < a1 and continuously differentiable with respect to a2 for 
a2 < a1:
The nominator of 휕훽
C
2,ABJ
휕a2
 is continuous for a2 < a1 and is 0 for a2 = a1.
𝜕
𝜕a2
((
a2 − c
)
ln
(
a1−c
a2−c
)
−
(
a2 + nc
)
ln
(
a1+nc
a2+nc
))
= ln
(
a1−c
a2−c
)
− ln
(
a1+nc
a2+nc
)
> 0 
for a2 < a1 implies that 
(
a2 − c
)
ln
(
a1−c
a2−c
)
−
(
a2 + nc
)
ln
(
a1+nc
a2+nc
)
 is negative for 
a2 < a1 . Thus, 
𝜕𝛽C
2,ABJ
𝜕a2
< 0 for a2 < a1 , i.e., 훽C2,ABJ is monotonically decreasing in a2 for 
a2 < a1 . For a2 = a0 , 훽C2,ABJ = 0 . Then, 
𝜕𝛽C
2,ABJ
𝜕a2
< 0 for a2 < a1 implies that 훽C2,ABJ is 
positive (negative) for a2 < a0(a2 > a0 ). Analogously, the findings for the single‑
market‑change approach with the ABJ specification (Eq. (1)) are obtained.
For the sequence‑of‑two‑market‑changes approach, 휀 = 0 , 훼 = 0 , Eqs.  (6) and 
(7), and dec = 0 , the BLS scaled percentage specification of Eq. (3) yields:
Then, 훽C
1,sBLS
 and dec = 1 is used to calculate 훽C
2,sBLS
:
For a0 = a2 , 훽C2,sBLS is 0. For a0 < a2 ( a0 > a2 ), 훽C2,sBLS is negative (positive). Anal‑
ogously, the findings for the single‑market‑change approach with the BLS scaled 
percentage specification (Eq. (3)) are obtained. □
𝛽C
1,ABJ
+ 𝛽C
2,ABJ
=
ln
(
a1 − c
a2 − c
)
ln
(
a1 + nc
a2 + nc
)
������� ������
>0
+ ln
(
a1 − c
a2 − c
)
������ �����
>0
∈ (0, 1).
𝜕𝛽C
2,ABJ
𝜕a2
=
(
a2 − c
)
ln
(
a1 − c
a2 − c
)
−
(
a2 + nc
)
ln
(
a1 + nc
a2 + nc
)
(
a2 − c
)
�� �
>0
(
a2 + nc
)
��� ��
>0
(
ln
(
a1 − c
a2 − c
)
+ ln
(
a1 + nc
a2 + nc
))2
������������������������� ������������������������
>0
.
훽C
1,sBLS
=
c(a1 − a0)(n + 1)
(a1 − c)(a1 + nc) − (a0 − c)(a0 + nc)
∈ (0, 1).
훽C
2,sBLS
=
c(a2 − a1)(n + 1)
(a2 − c)(a2 + nc) − (a1 − c)(a1 + nc)
− 훽C
1,sBLS
훽C
1,sBLS
+ 훽C
2,sBLS
=
c(a1 − a2)(n + 1)
(a1 − c)(a1 + nc) − (a2 − c)(a2 + nc)
∈ (0, 1).
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Proof of Proposition 3
For the sequence‑of‑two‑market‑changes approach, 휀 = 0 , 훼 = 0 , Eqs.  (6) and (7), 
and dec = 0 , the BLS percentage specification of Eq. (2) yields:
Then, 훽C
1,BLS
 and dec = 1 is used to calculate 훽C
2,BLS
:
훽C
2,BLS
 is positive. Analogously, the findings for the single‑market‑change 
approach with the BLS percentage specification (Eq. (2)) are obtained. □
References
Anderson SW, Lanen WN (2007) Understanding cost management: what can we learn from the evidence 
on “sticky costs?”. Working paper
Anderson MC, Banker RD, Janakiraman SN (2003) Are selling, general, and administrative costs 
“sticky”? J Account Res 41:47–63
Anderson MC, Banker RD, Huang R, Janakiraman SN (2007) Cost behavior and fundamental analysis of 
SG&A costs. J Account Audit Finance 22:1–28
Balakrishnan R, Gruca TS (2008) Cost stickiness and core competency: a note. Contemp Account Res 
25:993–1006
Balakrishnan R, Labro E, Soderstrom NS (2014) Cost structure and sticky costs. J Manag Account Res 
26:91–116
Banker RD, Byzalov D (2014) Asymmetric cost behavior. J Manag Account Res 26:43–79
Banker RD, Byzalov D, Chen L (2013a) Employment protection legislation, adjustment costs and cross‑
country differences in cost behavior. J Account Econ 55:111–127
Banker RD, Byzalov D, Threinen L (2013b) Determinants of international differences in asymmetric cost 
behavior. Working paper
Banker RD, Byzalov D, Ciftci M, Mashruwala R (2014) The moderating effect of prior sales changes on 
asymmetric cost behavior. J Manag Account Res 26:221–242
Banker RD, Byzalov D, Fang S, Liang Y (2018) Cost management research. J Manag Account Res 
30:187–209
Calleja K, Steliaros M, Thomas DC (2006) A note on cost stickiness: some international comparisons. 
Manag Account Res 17:127–140
Cannon JN (2014) Determinants of “sticky costs”: an analysis of cost behavior using United States air 
transportation industry data. Account Rev 89:1645–1672
Chen CX, Lu H, Sougiannis T (2012) The agency problem, corporate governance, and the asymmetrical 
behavior of selling, general, and administrative costs. Contemp Account Res 29:252–282
Holzhacker M, Krishnan R, Mahlendorf MD (2015) The impact of changes in regulation on cost behav‑
ior. Contemp Account Res 32:534–566
Kama I, Weiss D (2013) Do earnings targets and managerial incentives affect sticky costs? J Account Res 
51:201–224
Kitching K, Mashruwala R, Pevzner M (2016) Culture and cost stickiness: a cross‑country study. Int J 
Account 51:402–417
훽C
1,BLS
=
(a1 − a0)(a0 + nc)
a1(a1 + (n − 1)c) − a0(a0 + (n − 1)c)
∈ (0, 1).
훽C
2,BLS
=
(a1 − a2)(a1 + nc)
a1(a1 + (n − 1)c) − a2(a2 + (n − 1)c)
− 훽C
1,BLS
훽C
1,BLS
+ 훽C
2,BLS
=
(a1 − a2)(a1 + nc)
a1(a1 + (n − 1)c) − a2(a2 + (n − 1)c)
∈ (0, 1).
1 3
Research note: an analytical perspective on market decisions…
Li W‑L, Zheng K (2017) Product market competition and cost stickiness. Rev Quant Financ Acc 
49:283–313
Prabowo R, Hooghiemstra R, Van Veen‑Dirks P (2018) State ownership, socio‑political factors, and labor 
cost stickiness. Eur Account Rev 27:771–796
Subramaniam C, Watson MW (2016) Additional evidence on the sticky behavior of costs. Adv Manag 
Account 26:275–305
Tirole J (2001) The theory of industrial organization. MIT Press, Cambridge
Weiss D (2010) Cost behavior and analysts’ earnings forecasts. Account Rev 85:1441–1471
Publisher’s Note Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published 
maps and institutional affiliations.
